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Since the current policy known as “Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell” was adopted in the early 1990s, several changes have 
taken place which call into question the policy’s validity.  
Firstly, the argument proponents of the ban use to justify 
it, namely that cohesion would suffer if admitted 
homosexuals were allowed to serve, has been undercut by 
social science analyses on the correlation between cohesion 
and performance.  Their argument has also been undercut by 
empirical evidence from several nations that have lifted all 
restrictions on homosexual service, yet have suffered no 
decrease in cohesion or performance, despite the reticence 
of their respective militaries to lift the bans.  At the 
same time, the US public has moved toward a greater 
acceptance of the notion of admitted homosexuals serving in 
the military, with 79% approving in a December 2003 Gallup 
Poll, including 91% of all Americans age 18 - 29.  Evidence 
also indicates the current policy costs at least $40 million 
per year just to replace those who have been discharged due 
to their sexual orientation.  Other costs include wasted 
human resources at a time of critical shortfalls in many 
specialties essential to the ongoing Global War on Terror, 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
“To me, it was not a question of whether they were straight, 
it was a question of whether they could shoot straight.” – A 
decorated World War II Veteran on the question of his 
service alongside gays in World War II, as told to 
California Senator Barbara Boxer[1] 
 
A. HISTORY OF US ARMED FORCES HOMOSEXUAL POLICIES 
In July 1776, the United States of America declared its 
independence from Great Britain and declared that all men 
were endowed with certain unalienable rights.  In March 
1778, Lieutenant Gotthold Frederick Enslin became the first 
man to be forced out of the military of the United States on 
the charge of sodomy.[2] 
Since that time, tens of thousands of other soldiers 
have been removed from military service on charges relating 
to homosexuality.  For many years, such actions went largely 
unquestioned.  Since 1968, when Don Slater established the 
Committee to Fight Exclusion of Homosexuals from the Armed 
Forces, however, there have been an increasing number of 
dissenting voices.  Today, the official policy of the US 
Armed Forces is to force out any military member who 
participates in homosexual conduct, including the admission 
of homosexuality.  The rationale behind this policy states 
that homosexual conduct is harmful to unit cohesion and thus 
harmful to military efficacy.  This thesis intends to 
explore the validity of that rationale.  This topic is 
important because it deals with two issues vital to 
America’s past, present, and future: civil rights and 
military efficacy/national security.  All else being equal, 
a policy that denies civil rights but provides security is 
inferior to a policy that provides both civil rights and 
security.  The current policy denies civil rights under the 
auspices that doing so is vital to security.  If denying 
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those civil rights will not be a benefit to security, then 
it is improper to deny them. 
The first specific sodomy laws for the military were 
passed by Congress as the Articles of War of 1916, which was 
the first significant revision of military law since 1806.  
The maxim behind these laws, i.e. that homosexuality is 
incompatible with military service, remains in effect today, 
but is facing more challenges than ever before.  Beginning 
in 1922, homosexuals were discharged from the Army via 
“Section VIII,” described as a discharge for “inaptness or 
undesirable habits or traits of character.”[3]  While most 
individuals receiving this discharge were released under 
honorable conditions, homosexuals  were discharged without 
honor.   
In January, 1950, the newly created Department of 
Defense issued Army Regulation 600-443, titled “Personnel; 
Separation of Homosexuals.”  This regulation divided 
homosexuals into three categories: 1) Those who used 
coercion, deception, or rank to get homosexual partners.  
Category I individuals faced general court-martial.   
2) Those who engaged in consensual homosexual activity.  
Category II individuals received a dishonorable discharge if 
enlisted or were allowed to resign if officers.   
3) Those who exhibited, professed, or admitted homosexual 
tendencies but had not committed any provable acts of 
homosexuality.  Category III individuals received either a 
general or honorable discharge.[2] 
In 1956, the US Navy convened a board of naval and 
marine officers to study the situation and provide 
recommendations for homosexual policy for the navy.  The 
resulting report came to be known as the Crittenden Report, 
named after the chairman of the commission.  Among the 
report’s finding were the following: 
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• Many exclusively homosexual persons have served 
honorably in all branches of the military 
service without detection. 
• The concept that homosexuals necessarily pose a 
security risk is unsupported by adequate 
factual data. 
• The concept of homosexuality as a clinical 
entity has been discarded. 
Despite these findings, the policy remained unchanged.  
Interestingly, despite rumors of its existence, this report 
was kept secret for twenty years.  The report only came to 
light when some navy lawyers found it during a search of 
Pentagon files in 1976 and received a copy through the 
Freedom of Information Act of 1966.  Previous requests by 
members of Congress, among others, were met by the reply 
that no such report existed.  Even today, the “confidential 
supplement” to the report has never been released by the 
navy.[4] 
The first robust challenge to the Army’s homosexual 
policy came after the birth of the modern gay and lesbian 
movement in 1969.  Between 1969 and the end of the Vietnam 
War in 1973, several constitutional challenges were raised 
by military personnel, and in 1973, the American Psychiatric 
Association removed homosexuality from its list of 
psychiatric disorders.  Several of the constitutional 
challenges were successful, but the successes were short-
lived.  By the end of the decade, the nation’s political 
climate had begun to reflect greater input by social 
conservatism, and by the mid-1980s, the Department of 
Defense had passed directives ensuring homosexuality 
remained a cause for dismissal from the Armed Forces.  
Ironically, it was about this time that science began to 
conclude that homosexuality was not a choice, but rather was 
an immutable characteristic for individuals. 
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It was during the 1980s that the gay rights movement 
met its most serious judicial defeat, when the US Supreme 
Court ruled that Georgia’s ban against sodomy was 
constitutional.  This ruling has been used repeatedly as 
justification for the military’s ban on homosexual conduct.  
In 2003, however, the Supreme Court ruled in Lawrence vs. 
Texas that the Texas law banning sodomy was 
unconstitutional, and this ruling has already been used once 
as an argument against the military ban.  While that 
challenge was ruled inapplicable due to the particular 
circumstances, there are, as of August 2004, no fewer than 
nine other cases under appeal by way of the US Supreme Court 
Lawrence ruling.[5] 
Toward the end of the 1980s, the Department of Defense 
commissioned a new study to determine, among other things, 
the reality of homosexuality as “a condition related to 
trust violation” – the same basic issue the Crittenden 
Committee had investigated thirty years earlier.[6]  The 
study was conducted by the Defense Personnel Security 
Research and Education Center (PERSEREC) in Monterey, 
California.  The authors of the study not only concluded 
that homosexuals were not a security risk, but also 
concluded that there was no justifiable reason to exclude 
homosexuals from military service, stating that sexuality 
“is unrelated to job performance in the same way as is being 
left- or right-handed.”[6]  Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder 
(D-CO) had this to say about the report: 
The PERSEREC report is an excellent academic 
survey of the available literature on 
homosexuality in both civilian and military 
society.  Unfortunately, the [George H. W.] Bush 
Administration killed the report because its 
findings – that homosexuals are qualified for 
military service – ran afoul of its anti-gay 
prejudices.  When other members of Congress and I 
asked for an explanation, we were told that the 
report’s mandate was to look at the reliability of 
homosexuals for security reasons, not the 
suitability of homosexuals for military service.  
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That’s a distinction without a difference.  In 
fact, the report shows that gay men and lesbians 
are both suitable and reliable for military 
service.  The real question is how long the 
military can maintain a personnel policy based 
solely on prejudice.[6] 
 
Former President William Clinton promised to eliminate 
the ban in the campaign that led to his election.  Faced 
with significant resistance from military leadership, he 
instead eventually changed the policy to what became known 
as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.”  Since its inception, the 
additional monikers, “Don’t Pursue, Don’t Harass” (DADTDPDH) 
have been added.  According to the official policy 
guidelines, this policy states: 
Sexual orientation will not be a bar to service 
unless manifested by homosexual conduct. The 
military will discharge members who engage in 
homosexual conduct, which is defined as a 
homosexual act, a statement that the member is 
homosexual or bisexual, or a marriage or 
attempted marriage to someone of the same 
gender.[7] 
 
The new policy was made law by Congress, meaning any change 
made to the policy would have to be via Congress or the 
judiciary, as opposed to an Executive Order from the 
president.  While this policy fell short of what Mr. Clinton 
had promised, it was significant for the rights of gay 
military members for three reasons.  First, Congressional 
and military leaders acknowledged in their testimony before 
the Senate that homosexuals have served honorably in the 
past and can be expected to continue to do so.[1]  Second, 
the policy stated that homosexual status was no longer a bar 
to service.[7]  Third, the policy officially ended intrusive 
questions about service members’ sexual orientation and 
provided measures to deal with harassment.[7] 
 Those seeking repeal of the policy now consider these 
gains illusory and insufficient.  While homosexual status is 
technically acceptable, in practice the rules surrounding it 
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make it difficult for gays and lesbians to serve.  The 
framers of the policy worded it in such a way that admitting 
to homosexual status is defined as homosexual conduct.  
While many gays have been eliminated from service for 
violating the “Don’t Tell” portion of the policy, no one has 
been eliminated simply for violating the “Don’t Ask” 
portion, indicating there is still a bias against gays in 
the military.  Further, it became evident to all in 1999 
that harassment of gays was plentiful in the military, when 
Private First Class Barry Winchell was murdered by a fellow 
soldier after weeks of anti-gay harassment.  A survey taken 
after this incident found that anti-gay harassment was 
widespread throughout the military.  These events once again 
made the ban a political issue, and Democratic Presidential 
Candidate Albert Gore, Jr. promised a review of the policy 
if elected.  He lost the election, however, and the policy 
remained unchanged.   
 Still, certain civil rights groups have continued to 
keep pressure on policy-makers to lift the ban.  Since 
DADTDPDH was enacted, several changes have taken place in 
the United States and several other nations.  First, public 
opinion in the US has now moved strongly to the side of 
favoring the allowance of admitted homosexuals into the 
military.  Second, several US allies with similar values and 
concerns have allowed homosexuals to serve.  Third, 
scientific research has shed more light onto the causes of 
homosexuality. 
 
B.  A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE CAUSES OF HOMOSEXUALITY 
 The topic of causes of homosexuality remains 
controversial.  Volumes have been written, and still there 
is disagreement on the actual causes of homosexuality.  
Still, it is important to understand that homosexuality is 
not simply a choice people make for an alternative 
lifestyle.  If decision-makers recognize that sexual 
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orientation is to at least a large degree an innate trait 
like one’s gender or skin color, perhaps they will begin to 
look differently at the current homosexual policy.  If 
soldiers throughout the military recognized this, as well, 
the implementation of a new policy would be more 
successfully completed.  
What follows is some of the empirical evidence that 
indicates there is a strong correlative link between 
genetics, neurology, hormones, and sexual orientation.  What 
has become clear with current research is that homosexuality 
is generally not chosen by someone, but is in most cases an 
immutable characteristic of the individual. 
 One study supporting this notion found that of 37 
monozygotic twins, in every case, if one of the twins was 
bisexual or homosexual, the other was bisexual or 
homosexual.  Even in a case where two of the twins were 
separated at birth and grew up in different environments, 
both were found to be exclusively homosexual.[8] 
 Another study has been able to map an X chromosome 
linkage in chromosomal region Xq28.  This study found that 
gay men are more than six times as likely to have a gay 
brother than a heterosexual man, three times more likely to 
have a gay maternal uncle, but no more likely to have a gay 
paternal uncle.  If a gay man has a gay brother the 
likelihood increases that he will have a gay maternal cousin 
(an aunt’s son) compared to a heterosexual man.  This high 
correlation is evidence that there is a genetic trait passed 
to gay men through the maternal side of their family.[2] 
 Other studies have linked increased incidence of gay 
sons to mothers who suffered severe stress during pregnancy.  
The researchers concluded that the severe stress caused 
increased adrenaline levels in the mother, which in turn 
lowered testosterone levels in the male fetus.  
Testosterone, they believe, is linked to sexual orientation.  
Still others have linked the use of alcohol, marijuana, and 
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barbiturates during pregnancy to increased likelihood of gay 
offspring because these substances block “masculinization of 
the nervous system during neuro-organization.”[2]  The use 
of diethylstilbesterol, a synthetic estrogen used to reduce 
the risk of miscarriage, is linked to an increased 
likelihood of lesbian daughters.  Scientists have actually 
been able to use this knowledge to breed animals with higher 
rates of homosexuality in laboratory testing.[2]  
Homosexuality in the animal kingdom is far from limited to 
either humanity or to the laboratory environment.  Of the 
2000 or so species that have been studied in adequate depth, 
450 have been documented to exhibit homosexual behavior, a 
number approaching 25%.[9]  While this research requires a 
deeper investigation, it is apparent that there is a strong 
correlation between homosexuality and immutable 
characteristics such as genetics and the fetal environment. 
 In addition to this evidence of homosexuality as an 
immutable characteristic, there is also an indication that 
homosexuality is far more common than most people suppose.  
The most comprehensive studies done to date were by 
University of Indiana researchers led by Alfred Kinsey.  The 
studies used over 12,000 individuals over the course of ten 
years, and had at least 50 participants from each of the 48 
contiguous United States with representative samples from 
different races, sexes, social and education levels, ages 
from three to ninety, and various religions and marital 
statuses. 
 The wealth of data received for these studies enabled 
the researchers to create a seven-point scale of sexual 
orientation, ranging from zero to six.  Based on 
psychological reaction and overt experience, the scale was 
as follows: 
0) Exclusively heterosexual—no physical or psychical 
responses to members of one’s own gender 
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1) Predominantly heterosexual, only incidentally 
homosexual 
2) Predominantly heterosexual, but more than 
incidentally homosexual 
3) Equally heterosexual and homosexual (truly 
bisexual) 
4) Predominantly homosexual, but more than 
incidentally heterosexual 
5) Predominantly homosexual, but incidentally 
heterosexual 
6) Exclusively homosexual 
 
Using this scale led to some surprising data.  Of the 
12,000-person sample, the researchers found that  
37% of the total male population has at least some 
overt homosexual experience to the point of orgasm 
between adolescence and old age.  This accounts 
for nearly 2 males out of every 5 that one may 
meet.[10]   
 
Additionally, 13% of males react erotically to other 
males without having overt homosexual contacts after the 
onset of adolescence.  Fifty percent of all males who remain 
single to the age of 35 have had overt homosexual experience 
to the point of orgasm after adolescence.  Eighteen percent 
of males have at least as much of the homosexual as the 
heterosexual in their histories (i.e. rate 3 – 6) for at 
least three years between the ages of 16 and 55. Finally, 
10% of the males are more or less exclusively homosexual 
(i.e. rate 5 or 6) for at least three years between the ages 
of 16 and 55, while 4% are exclusively homosexual throughout 
their lives after adolescence.[10] 
 All individuals rated 2 – 6 would not be allowed to 
stay in the military. If the Kinsey data are correct, that 
means 25% of the male population is ineligible for military 
service.[10]  There are 50 million Americans between the 
ages of 18 – 30, approximately half of which are male.  In 
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other words, if the military’s policy on homosexuality is 
faithfully followed, there are 6,250,000 American males aged 
18 – 30 who are ineligible for service based strictly on 
their sexual orientation.  Currently, greater than 1% of 
Americans age 18 – 30 join the military (the number is 
actually higher for American males).  If that same 
percentage of the 6.25 million Americans age 18 – 30 who are 
currently banned were to join the military, the United 
States would find itself with 62,500 more military members.  
Not everyone agrees with Kinsey’s data, but even using a 
more conservative estimate of 3% for the percentage of 
homosexuality among the male population, there would still 
be 15,000 more 18 – 30 year-old volunteers for the military.  
In May 2004, Democratic Presidential Candidate John Kerry 
remarked that the US Military needs to increase its ranks by 
40,000.[11]  Other political leaders have made similar calls 
for more troops for the ongoing “War on Terror.”  The data 
indicate that allowing homosexuals to serve in a legitimate 
fashion would go a long way toward increasing the number of 
soldiers in the military. 
  
C.  ROADMAP 
This thesis will investigate these and other issues.  
Chapter II will explore the concept of cohesion, often cited 
as the reason to continue excluding admitted homosexuals 
from the ranks, by using meta-analyses of social science 
cohesion studies of both military and non-military groups.  
The conclusion of these analyses is that cohesion comes is 
two general forms, social cohesion and task cohesion.  While 
task cohesion is important to performance, social cohesion 
is not.  Homosexuals may affect social cohesion (although 
even this is disputed), but they do not affect task 
cohesion.  This chapter will also provide evidence from case 
studies of four nations, Australia, Great Britain, Canada, 
and Israel, which have lifted all restrictions on homosexual 
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service since DADTDPDH was implemented.  All four nations 
report the same results after lifting their restrictions: 
homosexuals have had no negative effect on cohesion, 
recruiting, or military efficacy.  Chapter III will explore 
the cost of the ban, both in fiscal and human resource 
terms, by compiling official government data for training 
and troop replacement.  A conservative estimate by the 
General Accounting Office states that the current policy 
costs nearly $40 million per year in troop replacement costs 
alone.  When the costs of wasted human resources and 
sanctioned discrimination are included, it is clear this 
policy is quite costly.  Chapter IV will summarize the 
thesis findings and provide suggestions for further 
research. 
While a court ruling may eventually determine the 
Department of Defense policy, as it has in some other 
nations, this thesis will attempt to answer the question of 
whether such a policy is rational and justified in terms of 
military efficacy, rather than strictly in terms of 
fairness.  There are sometimes justifiable reasons for the 
military to make policies that are unfair.  For instance, a 
quadriplegic would be a poor choice for an infantry unit, 
because his presence would harm military efficacy.  
Discrimination, in such a case, would be justified, and 
military efficacy would rightly have priority over the 
quadriplegic’s right to serve in the military.  Still, in 
the United States’ society, it is up to those choosing to 
discriminate to prove their case that the discrimination is 
indeed justified.  If that case cannot be proven, the 
discrimination should be eliminated.  If the discrimination 
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II. THE COHESION ARGUMENT 
 
“Open homosexuals would paralyze a unit, and degrade unit 
cohesion and erode combat effectiveness.”[12] 
- Then Air Force Chief of Staff General Merrill McPeak 
 
The primary argument presented by those who wish to 
continue excluding homosexuals from serving openly in the US 
Military goes as follows: Primary group cohesion is vital to 
military efficacy; homosexuals will harm cohesion; therefore 
homosexuals will degrade military efficacy.  This chapter 
will explore the validity of the two premises and conclusion 
listed above by first investigating the different types of 
cohesion and its effect on group performance, and then 
observing the empirical results on cohesion and performance 
of four nations, Australia, Great Britain, Canada, and 
Israel, that have recently lifted all restrictions on 
admitted homosexuals serving in their militaries. 
 Intuitively, it stands to reason that cohesion aids in 
military efficacy, as it would in the efficacy of any group 
of people working together toward a common goal.  Certainly, 
one would think, if given the choice between robust cohesion 
and poor cohesion, any leader would choose the former for 
his or her organization.  To verify this intuition, let us 
now take a look at several studies and analyses of those 
studies regarding the role of cohesion on the effectiveness 
of a group of individuals. 
 
A. SOCIAL COHESION VS. TASK COHESION 
 It is important to first clarify what is meant by 
cohesion.  While many different terms have been used, 
cohesion can be generally delineated into two types: social 
cohesion and task cohesion.  While traditional definitions 
are unspecific, social cohesion can be defined as the 
“social glue that results from all the forces that keep 
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members attached to the group.”[13] Others have defined it 
as “…that group property which is inferred from the number 
and strength of mutual positive attitudes among the members 
of a group.”[14, 15]  The emphasis in this type of cohesion 
is on the interpersonal relationships among the members of 
the group, and terms such as “mutual friendship,” “caring,” 
and “interpersonal attraction” apply.[15]  In 1993, the US 
Government commissioned a RAND study to develop a better 
understanding of the various issues concerning gays in the 
military.  One of those issues was that of social cohesion, 
defined in the RAND study as follows: 
Social cohesion refers to the nature and quality 
of the emotional bonds of friendship, liking, 
caring, and closeness among group members.  A 
group is socially cohesive to the extent that its 
members like each other, prefer to spend their 
social time together, enjoy each other’s company, 
and feel emotionally close to one another.[15] 
 
Task cohesion, on the other hand, emphasizes shared 
goals and dedication toward achieving those goals, and 
includes members’ respect toward the capabilities of the 
other members of the group.[13]  Terms such as “shared 
goals,” “teamwork,” and “coordination” apply to this 
definition.[15]  Once again from the RAND study: 
Task cohesion refers to the shared commitment 
among members to achieving a goal that requires 
the collective efforts of the group.  A group with 
high task cohesion is composed of members who 
share a common goal and who are motivated to 
coordinate their efforts as a team to achieve that 
goal.[15] 
  
To which of these two types are proponents of the ban 
referring when they express their fear that acknowledged 
homosexuals will harm cohesion?  Judging from the language 
they use, they appear to be referring to social cohesion.  
During the Senate Armed Services Committee hearings in 1993, 
for instance, then Army Chief of Staff General Gordon R. 
Sullivan stated  
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Cohesion is enhanced by uniformity, by adherence 
to a common sense of values and behavior.  The 
introduction into any small unit of a person whose 
open orientation and self-definition is 
diametrically opposed to the rest of the group 
will cause tension and disruption.[12] 
 
During the same session, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff General Colin Powell contended that military 
efficacy required the creation of “cohesive teams of 
warriors who will bond so tightly that they are prepared to 
go into battle and give their lives if necessary.”[12]  
While decrying the impact acknowledged homosexuals would 
have on the cohesion of the group, General Powell 
acknowledged that homosexuals have served with honor and 
excellence during the entire history of the US Military.  
Indeed, the military discharge records of homosexuals are 
filled with praise for job performance, dedication, and 
professionalism.[16]  Proponents of the ban are not arguing 
that homosexuals are inferior or inherently incapable of 
performing the demanding tasks required by members of the 
military.  Even if proponents attempted to make such an 
argument, they would find that the data to the contrary are 
simply too overwhelming to ignore.  Instead, they argue that 
the social cohesion they claim to be so vital to military 
success would be harmed by the inclusion of acknowledged 
homosexuals. 
 
B. SOCIAL COHESION’S EFFECT ON PERFORMANCE 
So the question now becomes, “Is social cohesion vital 
to military effectiveness?”  The answer, surprisingly, is 
no.  There are multiple paths and numerous studies that lead 
to this conclusion, including quantitative, experimental, 
historical, and sociological studies.  Even more 
surprisingly, some of these studies found that any causal 
link between cohesion and effectiveness was negative.  That 
is, they found that the more socially cohesive the group, 
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the less effective they were at accomplishing a given task.  
A 1972 review of the literature of this subject asked the 
question, “How can one continue to believe that productivity 
and cohesiveness are positively related when the results of 
competent research indicate that in many cases the opposite 
is true?”[17 quoted in Kier]   
To this day, little has changed.  Two studies from 
World War II are the primary sources for the tenaciously 
held belief that cohesion is vital to military 
effectiveness.  Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz performed 
an analysis of the German Army’s performance in World War II 
and concluded that the soldier’s solidarity with his 
comrades, not belief in a cause, was the reason the German 
soldier was motivated to fight.[18]  Samuel Stouffer and his 
comrades reached a similar conclusion after studying 
American troops in World War II.[19]  The conclusions from 
both these studies have since become disputed in the field 
of Social Science, however.  For instance, a study of German 
soldiers on the Eastern front concluded that social cohesion 
could not possibly explain the motivation of the German 
soldiers to continue fighting.  With 98% casualty rates 
among the enlisted men and with soldiers dying at an 
unimaginably rapid pace, Omer Bartov concluded that after a 
while, primary groups were unable to form, that there were 
no primary groups, and that raw recruits suffered 
devastating losses “without ever having the opportunity to 
get to know their comrades” but still kept on fighting.[20 
quoted in Kier 14] 
At best, several recent meta-analyses1 show a mild 
correlative link between cohesion and performance, but 
questions remain about whether even this mild linkage is in 
any way causative.[15]  In fact, when timing is taken into 
                                                 
1 A meta-analysis is a “study of the studies,” where all the 
variables and results from different studies are brought 
into a matrix to study for generalities. 
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consideration, the strong tendency is for cohesion to result 
from success, not the other way around.  For instance, yet 
another study of the German Army in World War II found no 
evidence that cohesion led to military effectiveness.  
Instead, it was the German Army’s superior performance 
(through better training, organization, and skill) that led 
to cohesion.[21]  In the words of one analyst, “it is often 
said about real-life groups that there is nothing like 
success to increase morale or group spirit.  A near 
universal finding is that cohesiveness generally increases 
with success.”[22]   
Additionally, when the type of cohesion is specified, 
the meta-analyses found that it was only task cohesion that 
was positively correlated to success, not social 
cohesion.[15]  This association of task cohesion and 
performance is entirely consistent with the results of 
hundreds of industrial-organizational studies that show the 
importance of goal-setting for an organization.[15]  
Therefore, the type of cohesion claimed by proponents of the 
ban to be essential to military effectiveness, social 
cohesion, actually has no positive effect on performance, 
and, as we shall see, may actually have a negative effect. 
Intuition tells us that individuals who like each other 
will be able to work together more effectively than people 
who do not.  Thus, any conclusions about the lack of any 
positive effect from cohesion will be counterintuitive.  
Nonetheless, as the RAND study on the subject concluded, in 
academic circles “it has long been recognized that social 
cohesion has complex and sometimes deleterious effects on 
various aspects of group performance.”[15]  Both military 
[23-27] and non-military [14, 17, 22, 28] research reviews 
reached this conclusion. 
Janis discovered that social cohesion can actually 
prompt groupthink, especially when “high cohesiveness is 
based primarily on the rewards of being in a pleasant 
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‘clubby’ atmosphere” or on being part of an elite team 
instead of being based on the opportunity to accomplish 
tasks with co-workers.[28]  Groupthink is a phenomenon 
whereby a group of people, often under pressure to make a 
quality decision, maintain an illusion of unanimity by 
refusing to be critical of each other’s ideas, refusing to 
seek expert outside opinion, or failing to examine 
sufficient alternatives.  A 1993 meta-analysis of nine 
studies of groupthink confirmed the conclusion that social 
cohesion promotes groupthink, while task cohesion helps 
prevent it.[15]  Other studies show that high social 
cohesion, and the resulting socialization, actually 
decreases productivity.  More energy is wasted on 
interpersonal relations than overcoming task obstacles.[22]  
Yet another concluded the following: 
People who flock together because they find each 
other attractive may or may not be inclined to 
work hard on a joint task.  Perhaps they will be 
content merely to savor the joys of intimate 
companionship, or be reluctant to mix business 
with pleasure.  Sociability does not necessarily 
breed productivity.”[15, 29] 
 
 This is not to say that cohesion is undesirable, just 
because there are documented negative effects that can 
result.  The conclusion from most researchers is that a 
moderate level, not a high level, of social cohesion is 
desirable.  The far more influential variable, however, is 
task cohesion.  As far back as the 1950s, studies were 
already demonstrating this.  Two of the earliest cohesion 
experiments found a positive cohesion-performance effect 
when groups operated under a high performance standard, but 
a negative effect when groups operated under a low standard. 
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[30, 31]  The lesson, to paraphrase Shakespeare’s Hamlet: 
“Cohesion is neither good or bad, but tasking makes it so.”2   
These findings have been verified repeatedly in 
clinical experiments.  Consistently, the studies have shown 
that social cohesion does not reliably lead to either 
positive or negative performance for a certain group, 
including elite army units such as the US Army’s Special 
Forces “A-team”.3  What is consistently correlated to 
positive performance is buy-in from everyone in the 
organization to work toward a certain task (i.e. task 
cohesion).  If highly cohesive units set a different 
internal task, it is that internal task, not the one given 
from the higher command, which is likely to be achieved.[17, 
22, 30-35]  Obviously, the goal of any command should be to 
ensure the internal primary group goals are the same as the 
command goals.  Ensuring this has proved to be more 
difficult when social cohesion is high.  High social 
cohesion creates pressure for a uniform response from all 
members of the group.  To quote one of the studies of groups 
with high social cohesion,  
If uniformity of response can be achieved more 
easily on a wrong or low-quality response, overall 
performance will decline while satisfactory 
interpersonal relations may be preserved.[22]   
 
Conversely, when social cohesion is moderate to low, the 
group is less likely to “buck the command” and set divergent 
internal goals. 
 
                                                 
2
 Original quote from Hamlet to Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern, “There is nothing either good or bad but 
thinking makes it so.” Hamlet, Act 2, Scene 2. 
3
 See Manning’s study of this highly cohesive unit, where he 
stated that among the “minuses of unit cohesion” is the fact 
that such units have high autonomy, and resent attempts at 
control from higher headquarters.  
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C. THE EFFECT OF HOMOSEXUALS ON SOCIAL COHESION 
 Many of the same studies listed above showed that while 
social cohesion had no consistent positive effect on 
performance, and sometimes had a negative effect, task 
cohesion did have a consistently high correlation to 
positive performance.  Inclusion of homosexuals into these 
primary groups would have no effect on task cohesion.  The 
goal for each of the members would be unchanged, and 
ideally, of course, would be for the success of the group.  
The only type of cohesion that would potentially be affected 
by making the group a more heterogeneous mix of individuals 
would be social cohesion, and this type of cohesion has no 
effect on the performance of the group.  However, it is also 
worth evaluating the premise regarding social cohesion, as 
the case for excluding homosexuals would be even weaker if 
their inclusion is unlikely to degrade social cohesion.  
Social science, the experience of foreign militaries that 
have allowed homosexuals to serve, and the experience of the 
United States when blacks and women began to serve, all show 
that even the premise of degraded social cohesion is 
dubious.   
To begin with, a recent CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll found 
that while 79% of the US public believes homosexuals should 
be allowed to openly serve, an even higher 91% of 18 – 29 
year-olds believe the same thing.[36]  Since recruiting is 
strongly tilted toward this age group for all services, it 
stands to reason that the group of Americans that would join 
the military after the ban was lifted would not a priori be 
against allowing homosexuals to serve, nor would they be 
against serving alongside them.   
Social science research on the conditions that enhance 
group cohesion suggests that there are at least ten factors 
that enhance group cohesion.  Some are structural, such as 
group size, the frequency and duration of contact, and the 
stability of membership.  Some are situational, such as a 
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sense of tradition or equity within the group, the group’s 
recent experiences (especially success), and the perception 
of a common enemy.  Finally, there are individual 
characteristics, such as similar backgrounds of class, 
region, age, or ethnicity.[15, 16, 37] 
 Only the last factor, homogeneity of individual 
characteristics, is relevant to the discussion of social 
cohesion and homosexuals in the military.  This factor is 
overwhelmed, however, by the importance of becoming a member 
of the group and interacting with other group members.  A 
study of the effect of internal disagreement found that 
social interaction “is such a powerful determination of in-
group attraction that it overrides the possible negative 
effects of the dissimilarity in belief systems.”[16, 38]  
Even social interaction is not necessary to create bonds 
within the group, however.  Social psychologists have 
learned that merely being placed in the group is enough to 
create positive attitudes toward the other members of that 
group, even is there is no social interaction between or 
within groups.  This holds even when members of the group 
dislike each other.  What these studies show is that it is 
not interpersonal attraction that leads to group cohesion, 
but group membership that leads to cohesion and 
interpersonal attraction.  As one of the studies noted, 
individuals “seem to like the people in their group just 
because they are in-group members rather than like the in-
group because of the specific individuals who are 
members.”[16, 39]  Other analyses show that leadership 
style, functional interdependence, spatial proximity, and 
common experiences are the critical sources of primary group 
cohesion, not individual characteristics.[18]   
This explains why there is no attempt on the part of 
the US Military to create homogeneous primary groups by 
placing individuals of common backgrounds, race, class, 
regional origin, or personality traits together with the 
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purpose of creating social cohesion.  It simply is not 
necessary for individuals to be alike in order to bond.  In 
fact, the military takes pride in taking disparate 
individuals, suppressing their individuality, and creating a 
team.  They also realize that to build that team, the 
element of social cohesion will naturally evolve among the 
individuals of the group with no external prompting.  A 
Walter Reed Army Institute of Research report stated 
“cohesion is presumed to be a by-product, not a core goal 
leaders need to be trained to create and maintain,” and that 
there is “no commitment in the Army to building and 
maintaining group cohesion.”[16, 40] 
 The cohesion argument used by proponents of the ban is 
profoundly flawed.  As Dr. Lawrence Korb, Assistant 
Secretary of Defense under Ronald Reagan, has pointed out, 
There are at least three… major problems with the 
“unit cohesion” argument.  First, it represents a 
severe and somewhat defeatist underestimation of 
the ability of today’s servicemembers to keep 
their focus on professional military concerns; it 
also represents a uniquely curious (and, I 
believe, incorrect) admission that our soldiers 
and sailors could not effectively follow orders 
and do their jobs if we lifted the ban.  Second, 
kowtowing to the prejudices of some by excluding 
others has never been an acceptable policy 
rationale, either in the military or in our 
society at large.  And third, in the several units 
where acknowledged homosexuals are serving today 
(usually, by court order), there are no signs of 
unit disintegration or bad morale.[41] 
 
Nearly ten years after Dr. Korb made those comments, there 
are still no signs of degraded cohesion in foreign 
militaries that have lifted their bans on homosexuals.  
In every US war since World War II, discharges of gay 
soldiers have dramatically dropped, only to rise again when 
peace comes.  In 1945, when the Army faced manpower 
shortages during the final European offensive, Secretary of 
War Harry Stimson ordered a review of all gay discharges and 
ordered commanders to “salvage” homosexual soldiers for 
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service when necessary.  In 1950, during the Korean War, the 
Navy’s gay discharge figures dropped from an average of 1100 
sailors per year down to 483, and then returned again to 
1353 in 1953 when the Armistice was signed.  The trend 
continued during the Vietnam War.  The Navy discharged over 
1600 sailors in each of the three years prior to 1966.  From 
1966 to 1967, the number dropped to 1094.  In 1968 gay 
discharges dropped to 798, and in 1969, at the peak of the 
buildup, the number dropped yet again, to 643.  In 1970, 
discharges dropped to 461.  Discharges began to increase 
once again in 1975.  For both Persian Gulf Wars, in 1991 and 
in 2003, the military formally issued a “stop-loss” order 
that suspended discharges.  According to the Wall Street 
Journal, the Pentagon allowed homosexuals to serve in the 
Persian Gulf despite a ban on their service, and later moved 
to discharge several gay veterans of the military 
conflict.[42]  
If the US Military is convinced homosexuals will harm 
unit cohesion, and that unit cohesion is vital to military 
success, why has the Pentagon chosen to relax the rules or 
suspend dismissals of homosexuals during times of war, when 
cohesion should be the most critical?  It seems the military 
would move more aggressively against homosexuals in time of 
war, since they are supposedly such a threat to cohesion.  
Instead, in every conflict since World War II, dismissals 
concerning homosexuality have dropped dramatically during 
the conflict, only to rise again when peace is restored.  As 
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force Executive Director Lorri 
L. Jean said after the discharges for gays were suspended 
after terrorist attacks against the US in 2001, 
Civil rights are not a matter of convenience.  If 
gay, lesbian, and bisexual servicemembers are 
qualified to serve in times of national crisis, 
what possible argument can be made that they are 
not qualified to serve openly in times of peace?  




D. THE EFFECT OF HOMOSEXUALS ON THE SOCIAL COHESION OF 
FOREIGN MILITARIES 
 
 Homosexuals are allowed to serve in the militaries of 
at least two dozen nations, including US allies such as 
Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, Israel, the 
Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom.  Among North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, only Turkey 
and Greece join the United States in banning homosexual 
service.  In 1993, the US General Accounting Office (GAO) 
examined twenty-five countries with militaries of over 
50,000 members, and closely studied the four nations most 
like the United States: Canada, Israel, Sweden, and Germany.  
According to the GAO, military officials from Canada, 
Israel, and Sweden all testified that the inclusion of 
homosexuals had not adversely affected morale, cohesion, or 
military effectiveness.  German officials said the inclusion 
was a “non-issue.”[44]  GAO’s final determination was that 
“the presence of homosexuals in the military is not an issue 
and has not created problems in the functioning of military 
units.”[44]  RAND Corporation’s National Defense Research 
Institute did its own research on seven of these nations, 
and concluded that “in all instances, the change in policy 
produced little real change in practice…”[45]  Since the 
time of the GAO study, the nations of Australia and Great 
Britain have begun to allow admitted homosexuals to serve, 
and they have also found it to be a non-issue.  What follows 
is a look at the particulars of four of these nations: 
Australia, Canada, Israel, and Great Britain. 
Recently, in a project directed by Aaron Belkin, the 
Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military 
(CSSMM) examined these four nations in hope of providing an 
in-depth analytical study where none existed before.  These 
four nations were chosen because there were certain 
similarities with the situation in the United States.  All 
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four countries faced stiff resistance from the military, all 
four have competent, professional militaries, and Australia, 
Canada, and Great Britain all have important cultural ties 
and similarities with the United States.  Additionally, 
supporters of the ban in the United States often cited the 
ban in Great Britain in order to bolster their argument for 
the status quo.  CSSMM has done the only comprehensive study 
to date for the countries of Great Britain and Australia, 
and their data is relied upon for the analysis of those 
cases in this thesis.  According to the CSSMM, to prepare 
for the surveys,  
Every identifiable pro-gay and anti-gay expert on 
the policy change in each country was interviewed, 
including officers and enlisted personnel, 
ministry representatives, academics, veterans, 
politicians, and nongovernmental observers.[46]  
  
The methodology for the CSSMM reports were as follows: 
Information collected for [these] report[s] [were] 
systemically gathered from publicly available 
primary and secondary sources relevant to an 
understanding of military outcomes associated with 
homosexual service in the Australian [British, 
Canadian, Israeli] Defense Forces.  Sources and 
methods included: identification, retrieval, and 
analysis of all prior research bearing on 
homosexual service in the Australian [British, 
Canadian, Israeli] Defense Forces conducted by 
governmental, academic, and policy-focused 
organizations in North America; content analysis 
of Nexis/Lexis search retrievals for all North 
American, European, and Asia-Pacific news articles 
and wire service dispatches relating to homosexual 
service in the Australian [British, Canadian, 
Israeli] Defense Forces before and after the ban 
was lifted; interviews undertaken with Australian 
[British, Canadian, Israeli] Defense Forces units 
and their senior representatives; snowball 
identification and interviewing of major academic, 
non-governmental, and policy experts on gay-
military issues in Australia [Britain, Canada, 
Israel] since the ban was lifted; and interviews 
with sexual minority participants in the 
Australian [British, Canadian, Israeli] Defense 
Forces who were located through the cooperation of 
leading non-governmental and military human rights 
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organizations. Australian [British, Canadian, 
Israeli] Defense Forces representatives were 
chosen by asking academic, non-governmental, and 
policy experts for suggested contacts who were 
knowledgeable about the military’s policy on 
homosexuality, and then using snowball 
identification techniques to identify other 
interview subjects.[47] 
 
As the following summaries of the research show, in all four 
cases the lifting of the ban on homosexual service had none 
of the negative consequences predicted. 
1. Australia 
 Prior to 1992, Australia maintained both formal and 
informal rules that prohibited homosexual service in the 
military.  Prior to 1986, the Australian Defense Forces 
(ADF) did not question individuals about their sexual 
orientation.[44]  Frequently, however, individuals were 
investigated on suspicion of homosexual activity, and if 
found guilty of such activity, were dismissed based on 
prevailing state and federal laws proscribing sodomy and 
homosexual relations.  In the 1980s, Australia incorporated 
international human rights accords into federal legislation.  
As a result, the ADF could no longer justify its 
investigations and expulsions on the grounds of existing 
sodomy and homosexual laws, so it issued its own formal 
policy of exclusion for homosexuals in September 1986.[47]   
 After the policy was made explicit, the ADF went 
through a period of inconsistent implementation, varying 
between tolerance and aggressive enforcement.  In many 
units, known homosexuals were allowed to continue to do 
their jobs in relative obscurity.  In others, as Dr. 
Katerina Agostino of the Macquarie University Department of 
Sociology notes, the military engaged in “witch hunts,” 
attempting to root out all homosexuals in the unit.   
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, various forces, 
including the shortage of qualified recruits, began to move 
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the ADF to question its exclusionary policy.  In particular, 
a sexual harassment investigation compared to the US Navy’s 
“Tailhook” fiasco forced a top to bottom review of ADF 
policies and attitudes about gender issues.  At the same 
time, Australia’s Human Rights Commissioner, Chris Sidoti, 
contended that the ADF ban was in violation of the spirit of 
the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), which was by then Australian law.  Opponents of the 
ban, using the ICCPR as a backdrop, grew in political power, 
and pressed the ADF to change its policy.  Another change 
was brought about by the fall of the Soviet Union and the 
resulting change in mission and attitude by members of the 
ADF.  After the threat of communism was lifted, volunteers 
for the ADF began to see the ADF as an occupation, rather 
than a calling.  ADF members began to expect the same types 
of benefits from their ADF jobs as they could expect in a 
civilian job, such as “regular working hours, free weekends, 
pension and benefits, and other freedoms and privileges 
associated with the civilian world.”[47]  The Australian 
populace was moving toward more tolerance and increased 
emphasis on freedoms and human rights, and the military 
found itself being pressured to adjust. 
 In 1990, a servicewoman made a formal complaint to the 
Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission 
(HREOC) and contended that her discharge had been at least 
partially based on the fact she was a lesbian.  The HREOC 
requested an explanation from the ADF, which responded by 
promising a review of the policy.  In June 1992, the Defense 
Minister informed Parliament that, upon recommendation of 
the Chiefs of Staff, the ban would remain in place.  This 
caused uproar among gay activists, and the government 
responded by appointing a special committee to investigate 
the matter.  Those members of the committee who favored 
repealing the ban contended that the military fell under the 
same rules as other organizations and should thus embrace 
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human rights rules and eliminate the discrimination.  
Committee members in favor of the ban claimed that lifting 
it would hinder the military’s effectiveness, combat 
performance, and morale.[47] 
 Finally, in late November 1992, the government accepted 
the recommendation of the committee and repealed the ban.  
In place of the old regulation, the ADF created a more 
general “sexual misconduct policy,” which referred to 
unacceptable sexual conduct without referring to sexual 
orientation.  The unacceptable conduct was described as any 
sexual behavior that negatively impacted group cohesion or 
command relations, took advantage of subordinates, or 
discredited the ADF, while recognizing that sexual relations 
were a part of adult life and predominately a private 
matter. 
 Predictably, the reaction to the change was not all 
positive.  The largest veterans’ group in Australia, the 
Returned and Services League, condemned the policy change 
and predicted that allowing admitted homosexuals to serve 
would shatter unit cohesion and lead to the deterioration of 
trust among soldiers, resulting in degraded military 
efficacy.[47] 
 Did such dire projections come to fruition?  All 
available evidence indicates they did not.  ADF Commodore R. 
W. Gates, equivalent to a one star flag officer in the US 
Military, remarked that lifting the ban was “an absolute 
non-event.”[48]  Professor Hugh Smith, a leading academic 
expert on the subject of homosexuals in the Australian 
Military, explained that several ADF officers had threatened 
to resign if the ban was lifted.  After the ban, no such 
resignations took place, and Smith stated that the rule 
change was accepted in accordance with military 
tradition.[49]  Yet another expert on the subject, Defense 
Ministry official Bronwen Grey, reported,  
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There was no increase in complaints about gay 
people or by gay people.  There was no known 
increase in fights, on a ship, or in Army units….  
The recruitment figures didn’t alter.[50] 
 
Even the President of the Returned and Services League, 
which had predicted doom and gloom in 1992, admits that 
inclusion has not been the issue his organization thought it 
would be.  In an August, 2000 interview, Retired Major 
General Peter Philips stated that gays in the military have 
“not been a significant public issue.  The Defence Forces 
have not had a lot of difficulty in this area.”[51]  A 
review of 622 documents and articles revealed no evidence 
that the lifting of the gay bans led to difficulties in 
recruiting or retention or undermined military 
performance.[46] 
 The data support the opinions of these experts.  In 
1997, Defence Equity began to track formal complaints about 
sexual misconduct via calls to its telephone advice line.  
The number of complaints involving homosexuality was less 
than 5% of the total calls received.4  According to Ms. 
Grey, these figures suggest “harassment regarding sexual 
orientation really isn’t significant in the ADF.”[52]  
Moreover, former Human Rights Commissioner Chris Sidoti 
estimated that his organization investigated only half a 
dozen complaints of sexual orientation discrimination in the 
five years following the removal of the ban.  Professor 
Smith concurred, saying that he was not aware of any notable 
incidents of harassment based on sexual orientation.[52]   
 Perhaps one of the reasons for the absence of 
difficulty in implementing the new rules is that there was 
no mass “coming out of the closet” after the ban was lifted.  
A 1996 report noted that three years after the ban was 
lifted, only 33 soldiers were willing to identify themselves 
as homosexuals to the authors of the study.[47]  This number 
                                                 
4
 37 calls out of 2136 involved homosexuality.   
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is well below the estimated number of homosexual soldiers 
serving in the ADF, indicating that the majority of 
homosexual soldiers have chosen to keep their sexual 
orientation to themselves.  Those who have chosen to declare 
have done so largely uneventfully.   
 One such officer was the second in command on board a 
destroyer.  The time when he declared his sexual orientation 
was the one incident that Commodore Gates recalled “created 
a bit of a stir.”[48]  According to the Commodore, the 
lieutenant commander told the ship’s captain that he could 
not continue to live a lie, and had thus chosen to come 
forward.  He was met with general support, continued to get 
the respect his position deserved, and both he and his 
crewmates moved on with their mission.  Since then, his 
career has moved forward, and he has been promoted to full 
commander.[47]  In addition to the absence of negative 
effects, there have actually been some positive effects from 
the lifting of the ban.  Not only has the ADF saved 
resources from not having to investigate and dismiss 
soldiers and train their replacements, but those soldiers 
who have identified themselves as homosexuals report 
productivity increases since they no longer have the anxiety 
and fear of losing their job based on their orientation.[41] 
 
2. Great Britain 
 British society has historically held intolerant views 
toward homosexuality.  Until 1967, homosexual acts were 
illegal under British law, and even after consensual 
homosexual activity was permitted for the public under the 
Sexual Offenses Act, it remained illegal for members of the 
British Armed Forces.  As of 1994, according to polling, a 
majority of Britons still believed that sex between members 
of the same gender was always wrong.[53]  At the same time, 
however, there appeared to be increased tolerance toward 
homosexuals, and by 1999, surveys showed that 70% of the 
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British populace favored including homosexuals in the 
military.[54, 55]  Despite public approval of this matter, 
military leaders vehemently fought any motion to include 
gays among their ranks.  Until 1992, the military continued 
to discharge gay soldiers under “disgraceful conduct of an 
indecent kind,” “conduct prejudicial to good order and 
discipline,” or “scandalous conduct by officers” 
charges.[56]  In 1992, Parliament acknowledged that the 
military exemption from the 1967 Sexual Offenses Act was no 
longer justified, and court-martials for certain charges 
were ceased.  Military leaders continued to insist, however, 
that homosexual conduct and military service were 
incompatible.  Until 1994, the British Navy gave detailed 
instructions to medical officers investigating suspected 
homosexual activity, recommending the use of ultraviolet 
light to test for semen or other bodily fluids, and 
recommended the medical officer determine whether the 
suspect might have played the passive role by looking for 
“feminine gestures, nature of clothing and use of 
cosmetics.”[55, 57]  Some estimates for the cost of this ban 
range between £40 and 50 million ($73 – 92 million US, $105 
– 133 million adjusted for inflation).[57] 
 Between 1994 and 2000, guidelines were standardized 
across all services, but homosexuals continued to be 
investigated, prosecuted, and discharged.  While some in the 
Parliament called for repeal of the ban, the military 
leaders argued that the military’s unique role of defense 
overruled any “social experimentation,” and stated that 
barracks life precluded it.  Such a move, they claimed, 
would “cause offence, polarize relationships, induce ill-
discipline, and as a consequence damage morale and unit 
effectiveness.”[55, 58] 
 After multiple court cases and continued resistance 
from the military, the European Court of Human Rights 
intervened, ruling that the ban was illegal.  On January 12, 
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2000, the ban was repealed, but the topic remains 
politically charged, as the Conservative Party has declared 
it will revisit the issue if it returns to power.[55] 
 So, what have the effects of the change been?  Like 
Australia’s repeal, the British change has been an 
unqualified success.  The military’s own internal review 
found that the new policy has “been hailed as a solid 
achievement.”[55, 59]  This internal review was never meant 
to be shown to the public, so it cannot be attacked as a 
political tool designed to win support for the new policy. 
 Specifically, the report, which was compiled from 
individual reports from all three Services, concluded that 
the new policy has had “no discernible impact, either 
positive or negative, on recruitment.”[55, 59]  One positive 
aspect of recruitment with the new policy is the increased 
access to recruiting opportunities on college campuses that 
heretofore forbade participation of the Armed Services on 
their campuses due to the military’s discriminatory 
policies.  After several years of recruiting shortages, the 
year of the repeal saw recruiting targets fulfilled.  A 
Ministry of Defense official stated, “Certainly recruitment 
hasn’t dropped dramatically —recruitment is quite buoyant at 
present.”[55, 60] 
 The Defense Ministry report also noted that there have 
been “no reported difficulties of note concerning homophobic 
behavior amongst Service Personnel.”[55, 59]  Despite 
warnings of mass resignations, only three people have 
resigned over the lifting of the ban.  The Central 
Discipline Office, which would track such matters, reports 
that there have been no incidents related to sexual 
orientation reported to its office since the ban was lifted.  
In the words of one staffer there, “The change in policy has 
been a complete non-event.”[55, 61] 
 In fact, those close to the scene in Great Britain have 
consistently used the word “non-event” to describe the 
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aftermath of the policy change.  Ms. Joan Heggie astutely 
points out that the lack of reports of bad news about the 
transition is a sign that there is no bad news to report.  
Since many military and political professionals were 
adamantly opposed to the change, any significant problems 
would have created a furor.  Instead,  
there has been no feedback the new policy is not 
working.  Certainly the fears of massive 
resignations or sexual harassment have not come 
true.[55, 62] 
 
Others report, “it’s a major non-issue, which has come as a 
considerable surprise,” “by and large it has been, 
therefore, a non-issue; it really has,”[55, 63] “we don’t 
really have the problems that we thought we’d have,”[55, 64] 
and “The anticipated tide of criticism from some quarters 
within the Service was completely unfounded.”[55, 65] 
 While the policy in Britain is still relatively new, 
and there are still questions to be answered about issues 
such as spousal privileges, it is clear that the transition 
has been a tremendous success.  Concerns of dire 
consequences have been completely replaced by an 
acknowledgement that the integration of admitted homosexuals 
has gone smoothly. 
 
3. Israel 
 Israel’s Defense Forces (IDF) are different in many 
respects from the forces of the other nations in this study.  
First, they are a universal conscription force, whereas all 
the others are volunteer forces.  This aspect is vital in 
understanding the importance of the IDF in Israeli society.  
The conscription period is considered a rite of passage akin 
to a “second Bar Mitzvah.”[66]  Second, they are a force 
that has been in combat almost without interruption since 
the nation’s inception in 1948.  This aspect has left the 
IDF with “warfighting experience unparalleled in the rest of 
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the world.”[67]  The threats against which the IDF is 
defending Israel are more direct and imminent than those 
against which the British, Australian, and Canadian Forces 
are defending.  Finally, Israeli society has historically 
seen homosexuality less favorably than any of the other 
societies in question, although amount of change in the 
legal standing of homosexuals over the last 15 years has 
been astonishing. 
 Until 1988, sex between consenting male adults was 
illegal, though rarely prosecuted by direction from the 
Attorney General’s office.  Sex between females was not 
addressed in the law.  In 1988, the Israeli government 
quietly decriminalized homosexuality in a sex crimes reform 
bill.  In 1992, a set of “Basic Laws” similar to the US Bill 
of Rights was passed which supercede all acts of Parliament.  
The court system has used this set of laws to increase the 
rights of all Israeli citizens, including sexual minorities.  
In 1998, a sexual harassment law was passed that forbade any 
intimidating or humiliating reference toward a person 
concerning his or her gender, sexuality, or sexual 
orientation.[66] 
 Due to its universal conscription and the perceived 
need for all available personnel in the military, 
homosexuality was never explicitly forbidden in the 
military.  Before 1980, however, an admission of 
homosexuality would likely have resulted in dismissal.[68, 
69]  In 1983, the regulations were changed to preclude 
barring homosexuals from service as a group, but the new 
policy prohibited homosexuals from serving in intelligence 
positions and required psychological testing for all known 
gays and lesbians.  The commanding officer was given great 
discretion in handling all such cases.  Of primary concern 
in these cases were the potential for blackmail, since 
homosexuality was taboo in Israeli society.  The regulation 
did not suggest that homosexuals are inferior soldiers, 
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merely that they could pose an increased security risk, and 
therefore bore watching more closely.  In 1993, the IDF 
repealed the measure requiring special screenings for 
homosexuals, and Israeli courts recently granted legal 
status to the same-sex dependent of a military member, 
stating the relationship constituted a common-law 
marriage.[66]  
 As with Australia and Great Britain, there is no 
evidence that allowing admitted homosexuals to serve has had 
discernible negative effects upon the IDF’s cohesion, 
morale, or efficacy.  There have been no official studies of 
the effects of the inclusion of sexual minorities on 
military performance.  The closest thing to statistical 
evidence is the report compiled by a special committee 
investigating sexual harassment.  Uzi Even, who was involved 
in the committee’s proceedings, reported that none of the 
sexual harassment cases involved sexual orientation.   
Interviews with officials from the IDF, embassy, 
government, and scholastic centers, as well as active, 
reserve, and retired homosexual soldiers indicate that 
homosexuals have had no negative impact.  Such interviews 
have been conducted by several different investigative 
agencies, including the US General Accounting Office, the US 
National Defense Research Institute Division of RAND, and 
the Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the 
Military. 
 According to the GAO report, homosexuals’ 
presence, whether openly or clandestinely, has not 
impaired the morale, cohesion, readiness, or 
security of any unit.  Perhaps the best indication 
of this overall perspective is the relative 
smoothness with which the most recent June 1993 
repeal of the remaining restrictions on 
homosexuals was received within the IDF and in 
Israeli society as a whole.[44] 
 
One prominent scholar and expert on the Israeli military, 
concurred with the GAO Report, stating,  
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As far as I have been able to tell, homosexuals do 
not constitute an issue [with respect to] unit 
cohesion in the IDF.  In fact, the entire subject 
is very marginal indeed as far as this military is 
concerned.[70] 
 
Finally, the RAND report states that, as far as living 
conditions, which are predominantly of the barracks variety, 
“the IDF reports no problems connected to homosexuality 
regarding privacy, showers, or unwanted sexual 
advances.”[67]  As with Australia, the repeal of the 
restrictions in the IDF has not resulted in a wave of 
individuals admitting to their homosexuality.  The risk of 
social ostracism is still perceived as great in Israel.  Of 
those who have admitted their sexuality, no significant 
problems have come to the attention of the diverse array of 
professionals interviewed by the GAO, RAND, or the CSSMM.  
Further, those individuals who have revealed their sexual 
orientation report positive responses to their 
revelation.[66, 71]  In fact, researchers have learned that 
before the restrictions were lifted, if individuals were 
regarded as good soldiers and their sexual orientation was 
exposed, they most likely would not be reported by their 
commander.  “A highly cohesive unit would retain its 
esteemed soldiers even if their sexual proclivities were 
disclosed.”[66, 68]  In any case, no research has revealed 
any negative impact on cohesion or military efficacy to one 




 Of all the military forces thus far examined, perhaps 
the case of Canada is most like that of the United States.  
The military vehemently opposed integration in Canada, the 
force is all-volunteer and professional, and the continent 
is shared between the US and Canada.  While some may argue 
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that Canada is far more liberal as a society than is the US, 
at the time of the change in military policy, in 1992, 
conservative parties had controlled the government for nine 
years.5  As RAND reports, “With the notable exception of the 
issue of homosexuals in the military, Canadian and US 
attitudes towards homosexuals differ more in degree than in 
kind,” with only a few percentage points difference in 
public opinion on questions about equal rights for 
homosexuals and the morality of same sex relationships.[67] 
Prior to 1988, homosexual policy in Canadian Forces 
(CF) was governed by regulation CFAO 19-20, entitled 
“Homosexuality-Sexual Abnormality-Investigation, Medical 
Examination and Disposal.”  This regulation stated that 
Service policy does not allow homosexual members 
or members with a sexual abnormality to be 
retained in the Canadian Forces.[72] 
 
Not only were gay service members dismissed, their fellow 
soldiers were compelled to inform the chain of command if 
they discovered the orientation of a homosexual.  In 1985, 
the Canadian Justice Department, under the guidance of the 
Canadian Human Rights Act of 1978, ordered a review of the 
military’s rules concerning sexual orientation.  In a 
response to the request, CF officials created a Charter Task 
Force, which conducted a survey of 6,580 soldiers, and found 
that 62% of male soldiers would refuse to share showers, 
undress, or sleep in the same room with homosexuals, and 45% 
of them said they would refuse to even work with 
homosexuals.[72]  Using these statistics, the Charter Task 
Force submitted its final report to the government in 
September, 1986, and recommended the exclusionary policy be 
retained.  Specifically, the report stated: 
The presence of homosexuals in the CF would be 
detrimental to cohesion and morale, discipline, 
                                                 
5
 Political scientists have found that citizens of Canada 
typically poll 5 to 8 percentage points to the left of US 
citizens.(RAND) 
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leadership, recruiting, medical fitness, and the 
rights to privacy of other members…the effect of 
the presence of homosexuals would be a serious 
decrease in operational effectiveness.[67, 73] 
 
 The Minister of Defense accepted this report and the 
policy remained unchanged for the time being.  Gradual 
changes were made to the policy.  In 1988, the Defense 
Minister changed the policy to allow known homosexuals to 
remain in the military, but not be eligible for certain jobs 
or for promotion. 
 In 1989, an Air Command lieutenant charged with 
lesbianism brought suit against the government under the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  The CF initially sought to 
defend the policy, using the Final Report as evidence.  In 
the end, the CF determined they did not have a viable case 
to support the discrimination, noting, “much of the evidence 
they were prepared to offer had little substantive 
merit.”[67]  Finally, on October 27, 1992, the CF agreed to 
settle the lawsuit.  As part of the settlement, the Federal 
Court of Canada declared the homosexual policy contrary to 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the CF 
announced that the prohibition against homosexuals would be 
negated immediately.[67] 
 What has happened to the Canadian Forces since 
homosexuals were allowed full membership in their ranks?  As 
has been the case with Australia, Great Britain, and Israel, 
there have been no significant negative effects of the 
policy change.  Despite threats to the contrary, there were 
no resignations specifically as a result of the new rules.  
The National Defense Research Institute reported that  
According to CF officials, they have noticed no 
changes in behavior among their troops.  They say 
they know to date of no instances of people 
acknowledging or talking about their homosexual 
relationships, no fights or violent incidents, no 
resignations (despite previous threats to quit), 
no problems with recruitment, and no diminution of 
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cohesion, morale, or organizational 
effectiveness.[67] 
 
A 1995 Canadian government internal report on the lifting of 
the ban concluded,  
Despite all the anxiety that existed through the 
late 80s into the early 90s about the change in 
policy, here’s what the indicators show—no 
effect.[46, 74] 
 
The report also found the following: 
• Of 905 assault cases for the period of November 
1992 until August 1995 (the time of the 
report), none involved “gay-bashing” or could 
in any way be attributed to the sexual 
orientation of one of the parties.   
• Of 504 sexual misconduct cases during the same 
period, only 10 involved same-sex adult 
misconduct. 
• Of 213 human rights complaints filed during the 
period, only one was based on sexual 
orientation, and it involved the eligibility of 
same-sex financial benefits. 
• Of the approximately 2000 military grievances 
reported to the National Defense Headquarters, 
no more than a dozen involved sexual 
orientation. 
• Behavioral and conduct data compiled by several 
governmental agencies in National Defense 
Headquarters yielded little or no evidence to 
suggest that allowing homosexuals to serve in 
the Canadian Forces has been problematic, 
either in terms of their behavior or their 
treatment by other members.[75] 
As with the other nations, it appears that there are 
significant numbers of homosexuals in the military who have 
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chosen not to identify themselves.  Using self-report 
information from anonymous large-sample surveys of CF 
members conducted in 1986 and 1991, Canadian officials 
estimate the homosexual and bisexual representation in the 
military at about 3.5%.[75]  Despite a 1996 memorandum that 
entitled same-sex partners full benefits if they filed the 
appropriate paperwork, it appears that few couples have 
chosen to participate.  In April 1999, for example, a 
National Defense report revealed that only 17 claims for 
medical, dental, and relocation benefits for gay and lesbian 
partners had been filed in all of 1998, all by women.[72] 
The experiences of Canada in its integration are 
consistent with those of Great Britain, Australia, Israel, 
and all the other nations that allow admitted homosexuals to 
serve in their militaries.  Simply stated, there is no 
evidence in any of these nations that shows the integration 
of homosexuals has been detrimental to cohesion, discipline, 
morale, or efficacy. 
The parallels between the experiences of several of 
these nations and the experience of the US military in its 
integration of African-Americans are undeniable.  Prior to 
integration, US leaders claimed such a step would be a 
threat to the “efficiency, discipline, and morale” of the US 
military, and that the “Army is not a sociological 
laboratory.”[76]  The US Navy presented the following 
argument against integration: 
Enlistment for general service implies that the 
individual may be sent anywhere—to any ship or 
station where he is needed.  Men on board ship 
live in particularly close association; in their 
messes, one man sits beside another; their 
hammocks or bunks are close together; in their 
common tasks they work side by side; and in 
particular tasks such as those of a gun’s crew, 
they form a closely knit, highly coordinated team.  
How many white men would choose, of their own 
accord that their closest associates in sleeping 
quarters, at mess, and in a gun’s crew should be 
another race?  How many would accept such 
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conditions, if required to do so, without 
resentment and just as a matter of course?  The 
general Board believes that the answer is “Few, if 
any,” and further believes that if the issue were 
forced, there would be a lowering of contentment, 
teamwork and discipline in the service.[41, 77] 
 
Replace the references to race with references to sexual 
orientation in the above quote, and it could easily pass for 
an argument against homosexual integration today.  Of 
course, President Harry Truman integrated the military with 
Executive Order Number 9881 in 1948.  The dire predictions 
of those against integration never materialized.  In fact, 
today, the military is “one of the most integrated 
institutions in American life and one of the few places 
where people of color commonly supervise whites.”[41] 
 The analogy, like all analogies, is not perfect.  
Still, the similarity in words, tone, and reasoning of those 
who argue for exclusion are striking.  In both cases, the 
primary argument for exclusion has not been one of 
inferiority, but rather one of the unacceptable reactions of 
others.  It is no more logical to argue for excluding 
homosexuals based on the reaction of heterosexuals than it 
is to argue for excluding blacks based on the reaction of 
whites, or of excluding women based on the reaction of men. 
  
E. CONCLUSIONS  
This chapter has shown that the argument used to 
continue the ban is flawed.  Proponents of the ban contend 
that the presence of admitted homosexuals will hurt 
cohesion, thus harming military efficacy.  A close 
observation of this argument shows that the type of cohesion 
to which proponents of the ban refer, social cohesion, has a 
minimal impact on the performance of a group.  Rather, it is 
task cohesion, the force that makes individuals work 
together to achieve a certain goal, which has an impact on 
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group performance.  Task cohesion is not threatened by the 
presence of admitted homosexuals. 
 Furthermore, the empirical evidence from foreign 
militaries gives every indication that the presence of 
homosexuals is not disruptive.  Australia, Canada, Great 
Britain, and Israel have lifted all restrictions on the 
service of homosexuals in their armed forces.  While 
politicians and military leaders warned of dire consequences 
if those restrictions were lifted, they have all reported 
the same consequences from the lifting of their bans:  no 
impact. 
 While lifting the ban would have no negative impact on 
the US military, keeping the ban is having a negative 
impact.  The following chapter will explore the costs of the 
current policy, in fiscal and other terms. 
 
 43
III. THE COST OF THE BAN 
 
“If the misery of our poor be caused not by the laws of 
nature, but by our institutions, great is our sin.” 
- Charles Darwin 
 
 The US Office of Management and Budget estimates the US 
budget deficit will be a record $422 billion in 2004.  If 
there are areas in the budget where costs can be reduced 
with minimal or no negative impact, those areas should be 
cut.  If cutting those programs would improve not only 
efficiency, but also effectiveness, while improving civil 
rights for a group of US citizens, the appropriate action 
would seem to be obvious.  This chapter first summarizes the 
budgetary impact of the ban, then considers its non-
financial costs. 
 
A. FINANCIAL COSTS 
An exact cost of the current policy concerning 
homosexuals is extraordinarily difficult to calculate, but 
even a conservative estimate suggests that the price the US 
is paying for the ban is exorbitant in multiple ways.  This 
chapter will show some of the ways the policy is costing the 
nation, not only monetarily, but also in the areas of wasted 
human resources and overall military efficacy. 
 The fiscal cost of the ban is one that has been only 
partially researched by any official study.  In 1992, the US 
General Accounting Office conducted a study to determine the 
cost of replacing soldiers who had been discharged due to 
homosexuality.  For this study, only the cost of recruiting 
and training could be readily estimated, using data provided 
by the services themselves.  Unadjusted for inflation, the 
GAO determined that the average cost of replacing an 
enlisted soldier was $28,226, and the average cost of 
replacing an officer was $120,772.[78]  Adjusted for 
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inflation, the figures jump to $36,383 and $155,675, 
respectively.  The GAO figures only included the cost to 
train and replace the lost soldiers.  A more accurate 
estimate would also include the various costs of discharging 
each of the soldiers.  Factors in such an estimate would 
include the lost productivity time of the commanders, 
investigators, lawyers, judges, clerks, discharge board 
members, and suspects themselves, to name but a few. 
 Even without these additional factors, the fiscal cost 
is surprising.  The vast majority of discharges are enlisted 
troops.  From 1998 through 2003, there were 76 officers 
discharged for homosexuality, compared with 6197 enlisted 
soldiers.[79]  The total cost to replace the soldiers 
discharged since 1998, then, is $225,468,673 for enlisted 
soldiers and $11,831,375 for officers.  The combined cost is 
$237,300,048, just since 1998.  That equates to $39,550,008 
per year, just for replacement cost.  That is equal to 
$108,356 per day, or $4514 every hour, and this is an 
underestimation of the actual cost. 
 As an example of how much the process of discharging a 
homosexual costs, consider that by regulation, all 
individuals being considered for discharge based on 
homosexuality are entitled to have the case heard before an 
Administrative Discharge Board.  Such a board is required to 
be comprised of at least three experienced commissioned, 
warrant, or noncommissioned officers.  Enlisted personnel 
assigned to the board must be in the grade of E-7 or above, 
and there must be at least one officer in the grade of O-4 
or above, and a majority of the board must be commissioned 
or warrant officers.  Therefore, the minimum cost situation 
for such a board would be one consisting of an O-4, W-1 
(warrant officer), and E-7.  The salaries (base pay only) 
for these ranks, with 10 years experience, are as follows: 
O-4 = $61,644; W-1 = $36,478; E-7 = $35,907.  Broken down 
into daily pay, for 260 workdays per year, the figures would 
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be $237, $140, and $138.  Therefore, for a one-day 
Administrative Discharge Board (and many last more than one 
day), the cost in lost productivity, in salary alone and for 
the board members alone, would be $515.  If only 500 of the 
military members being dismissed opt for the discharge 
board, the cost would be over $250,000 per year.  This cost 
does not include the lost wages for witnesses, commanders, 
judges, clerks, and lawyers.   
 An additional cost in terms of lost productivity is 
that of the investigation.  The military keeps no record of 
time spent on such investigations, but the cost would be 
significant if it did.  For example, West Point Cadet Nicole 
Gavin found herself at the center of an investigation into 
her sexuality when she was asked point blank by her 
commander whether she was a lesbian.  She told her commander 
the question was inappropriate and reported him, after which 
her commander, apparently in retaliation, ordered her 
personal diary be taken, as well as 250 pages of e-mail, to 
attempt to verify her sexual orientation.  This 
investigation, like so many others, then turned to 
interviews with dozens of her classmates, commonly involving 
between 90 and 150 questions each about their private lives.  
It is common for investigative officer reports to be between 
200 – 500 pages long and several inches thick.[13]  The cost 
of these investigations is not reported in any of the 
official estimates of the cost of the ban, but the typing 
alone for a 500 page report would take several man-days. 
 
B. OTHER THAN FINANCIAL COSTS 
 The costs go beyond mere finances, however.  The policy 
forces unsavory decisions to be made every day in the US 
Armed Forces.  Take, for instance, the case of a widely 
publicized investigation that began at Hickam AFB, Hawaii, 
and resulted in a total of eighteen dismissals from the Air 
Force, Army, and Navy.  The names of seventeen of these 
 46
individuals were given up in a plea bargain with a soldier 
charged with male-male rape, among other infractions.  The 
soldier faced life in prison, but prosecutors reduced his 
sentence to twelve months in return for naming other 
homosexuals for dismissal.[13]  In its effort to enforce the 
ban, in other words, the military chose to reduce the 
punishment in a case where a serious crime was charged. 
 The choices forced upon homosexuals who choose to 
quietly serve are also troubling.  Imagine the cost of being 
forced to live a lie, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a 
week, for the entire period of one’s service.  The first Air 
Force core value is “Integrity First.”  Yet every time 
someone asks a gay soldier a question such as “Why aren’t 
you married? Who was that on the phone? With whom did you 
share your vacation? Who is this in the photograph?” the 
soldier is forced to lie, evade, or dissemble.  
Heterosexuals need not worry about such questions, but 
homosexuals have to carefully construct every sentence they 
say to avoid suspicion.  One slip-up could cost them their 
career.  Even without a slip-up, the cost to their integrity 
is great.  Aristotle proffered that habituation was the key 
to character development.  The core values of each of the 
services emphasize individual character, yet the current 
policy leaves homosexuals no choice but to live a lie if 
they wish to continue to serve.   
 Not only is the integrity of homosexuals damaged by the 
policy, but their productivity is also.  Imagine fearing 
that every click on your phone is an investigator listening 
to your conversation. Imagine wondering whose van is parked 
across the street from your apartment. Imagine being called 
into your commander’s office and not knowing whether you are 
about to be commended for your good work or told you are 
under investigation for homosexuality.  Imagine your 
workplace filled with disparaging remarks about your type, 
and being too afraid to speak up for yourself and those like 
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you.  A recent survey of 75,000 service members found that 
80 percent of them had heard anti-gay comments in their 
units.  When commanders heard such comments, they almost 
never put a stop to it.[80]  Imagine being told at an anti-
harassment briefing that homosexual conduct in incompatible 
with military service.  Imagine feeling like a second-class 
citizen, not because of your performance, but because of who 
you are.  Perhaps psychologists could put a dollar figure on 
the toll this scenario takes on gay service members and 
their productivity.  If they could, the sum would be 
considerable.[13] 
 There is a cost to any organization that condones 
discrimination, and not only for the individuals against 
whom the discrimination occurs.  The day after Reverend 
Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated in 1968, a third 
grade teacher named Jane Elliot decided to conduct an 
experiment with her students.  She informed them that brown-
eyed people were superior since they had more melanin.  She 
then forbade the blue-eyed children from drinking from 
certain water fountains and allowed the brown-eyed children 
extra time at recess.  What she found was deeply troubling 
to her.  While she had taught her students to judge one 
another, she had not taught them to oppress one another.  
She discovered that they did not have to be taught.  The 
mere delineation of superiority / inferiority was enough to 
make the brown-eyed children begin to subjugate the blue-
eyed children.  She has since repeated the experiment 
numerous times, under various conditions, with adults, and 
found the same type results.[81]  When soldiers are told 
that homosexual behavior is incompatible with military 
service, the message is loud and clear.  Homosexuals are 
inferior, and heterosexuals are superior, not because of 
their job performance, but because of who they are.   
An environment such as this, as Ms. Elliot’s 
experiments would predict, will inevitably lead to a hostile 
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environment unless counteracted.  When homosexual slurs are 
as common as polls verify, it is clear the military is 
already a hostile environment for homosexuals.  Such an 
environment encourages not only harassment, but also 
violence.  When a soldier named Barry Winchell had his head 
crushed by a fellow soldier wielding a baseball bat, it 
quickly became evident that Private First Class Winchell had 
endured a hostile anti-gay environment for some time.  
During the trial of the accused, witness after witness 
testified that PFC Winchell had faced daily anti-gay 
harassment for four months prior to his murder and that his 
commanders did nothing to stop it.[13]  Neither hostility 
nor violence helps military efficacy, but the current policy 
concerning homosexuals promotes both.   
Interestingly, in the Canadian Forces, after the ban 
was lifted, complaints of sexual harassment against women 
went up by nearly 50%.  This did not happen because sexual 
harassment went up, but rather because women now felt safe 
to report harassment without being suspected of being 
lesbians.[72]  Empowering women to stand up for themselves 
is the surest way to decrease sexual harassment against 
them.  Empowering homosexuals to stand up for themselves is 
the surest way to end harassment against them, as well.  As 
long as homosexuals know they will be investigated and 
possibly discharged if they dare to report harassment, they 
will continue to choose against reporting harassment.  
Teaching tolerance of differences does not harm cohesion and 
efficacy; it helps them.  The current policy teaches 
intolerance, and is thus a danger to the military team.   
 Not only is the current policy costing the United 
States fiscally and in terms of the environment in the 
military, but also it is costing the US Armed Forces dearly 
in terms of human resources.  This is apparent strictly 
taken from a population perspective.  The US Census Bureau 
estimates there are over 50 million Americans between the 
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ages of 18 and 30 years old.[82]  The exact percentage of 
those individuals who could be classified as homosexual is 
difficult to discern.  According to the most comprehensive 
study to date, Alfred Kinsey’s Sexual Behavior in the Human 
Male, only 50% of the population is exclusively heterosexual 
throughout adult life (defined as at least one homosexual 
experience).  Another study determined that 30% of a group 
of 291 seventh and eighth graders had had adolescent 
homosexual experiences to the point of orgasm.  A study of 
college age males found that 27% had had an overt homosexual 
experience involving orgasm.  Among white males, Dr. Kinsey 
determined that 10% are exclusively homosexual between the 
ages of 16 – 65.[10]  Other studies have concluded the 
percentage of exclusively homosexual men and women to be 
between 3 – 5%.  Using these numbers, an additional 1.5 - 
2.5 million Americans age 18 - 30 would be available as a 
resource upon which the military could recruit.  In the 
words of the late conservative Senator Barry Goldwater (R-
AZ), government should stay out of people’s private lives 
and 
Stay out of the impossible task of legislating 
morality.  But legislating someone’s version of 
morality is exactly what we do by perpetuating 
discrimination against gays.  When you get down to 
it, no American able to serve should be allowed, 
much less given an excuse, not to serve his or her 
country.  We need all our talent.[83] 
 
Alexander the Great, one of the most impressive military 
leaders of all time, was a homosexual.  Today, if a person 
of similar talent and sexuality came knocking on the door of 
the US Military, he would not be allowed to serve, unless he 
wanted to live a lie.  Perhaps there are no homosexuals of 
such caliber in the United States, but there are thousands 
of men and women who could perform admirably in the service 
of this nation.  Excluding them does not help the military; 
it hurts it. 
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 Consider the repercussions of discharging perfectly 
capable soldiers who are already trained in their specialty, 
many of which are desperately undermanned.  For instance, in 
July 2004, the Pentagon mobilized 5,600 soldiers from the 
Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).  The IRR is a pool of former 
military personnel who either volunteer to be on call for 
duty or who, because of their initial enlistment contracts, 
owe up to four years in the IRR after they leave the 
military.  The IRR is almost never activated—an Army 
official admitted that many of the civilians called to duty 
would be “shocked” to learn they were now committed to a 
year’s duty in Iraq.[84]   
 According to Army and Department of Defense numbers, at 
least 948 gay service members with the exact specialties 
being recalled have been forced out of the military under 
the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy over the last five years.  
The Army is seeking 790 truck drivers to serve a year in 
Iraq.  At least 113 military truck drivers were forced out 
over the last five years.  The Army seeks 211 food service 
operators, and 153 have been discharged.  The Army needs 531 
administration specialists, 234 have been booted; 361 light 
wheel mechanics, 122 were discharged; 52 tracked-vehicle 
mechanics, 28 were booted; 307 medical personnel, yet 212 
general medical personnel have left, along with dozens of 
surgeons, dentists, doctors, and nurses.  The list 
continues, as the Army seeks 143 combat engineers, while at 
least 57 were forced out from 1998 to 2003.[84] 
  Perhaps the number of linguists dismissed recently 
best demonstrates the wastefulness of the policy.  Due to a 
critical shortage of trained Arabic linguists, the military 
has hired private contractors to conduct interrogations and 
provide translation to intelligence teams.  At least three 
such contractors have been implicated in an embarrassing 
scandal at Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq.  The cost of only one 
of these contracts, to Titan Corporation, is $657 million.  
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Additionally, many of these hired linguists were not 
qualified, as Titan became so desperate it began hiring taxi 
drivers, shopkeepers, and schoolteachers in Iraq.  For 
instance, at Abu Ghraib, Sergeant 1st Class Paul Shaffer 
said, “I’ve dealt with professional linguists before, and 
(the Titan hires) weren’t professionals.  You at least have 
to have a grasp of the English language, and these guys 
didn’t.”[85]  The military has discharged at least 73 
intelligence professionals and an additional 15 specialists 
in language interrogation since 1998 under “Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell.”[79]  In addition, 37 linguists have been discharged 
for homosexuality from the US Army’s Defense Language 
Institute in the last two years alone.[86] 
 While these numbers are striking enough, they do not 
even take into account the gay individuals who voluntarily 
give up on promising careers because they can no longer 
tolerate harassment and the feeling of inferiority and 
tension created by the hostile environment in today’s 
military.  These numbers, of course, cannot be tracked, 
since the individual never admits to his or her 
homosexuality.  C. Dixon Osburn, Executive Director of 
Servicemembers Legal Defense Network, a national nonprofit 
organization that provides assistance to service members 
harmed by “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” is convinced by his 
experience that there are “hundreds of service members who 
[voluntarily] leave the military every year because of the 
gay ban.”[13] 
Recalling 5,600 soldiers who thought they had safely 
completed their service to this country and returned home to 
their families, while at the same time discharging nearly 
6,300 competent soldiers over the last five years makes no 
sense.  Homosexuals would not harm cohesion or efficacy, and 
the cost of the ban is staggering.  Simply stated, the 





 The current policy concerning homosexuals is 
extraordinarily costly.  While some costs are measurable, 
like the billions of tax dollars wasted over the years 
replacing competent soldiers who desired to serve, others 
are immeasurable.  Since 1950, the various policies banning 
homosexuals have cost nearly $2 billion in replacement costs 
alone.  The cost in human resources have added up over that 
time, as well.  While the military has often responded by 
relaxing the ban when in dire need of soldiers, the number 
of homosexuals who have simply chosen to never join is 
inestimable.  It has become apparent that the policy has 
cost the military in critical specialties for the “War on 
Terror,” such as interrogators and linguists.  For those 
gays and lesbians who have tried to brave the slings and 
arrows of being a homosexual in the US military, the cost 
has been to live a life of secrecy, deception, and paranoia.  
The cost to these individuals, and to the organization that 
is denying them equality, is also inestimable.  Such costs 
might be justifiable if there were good reasons for the 





 The military is a large organization, and large 
organizations take time to change.  Lifting all restrictions 
on homosexuals serving in the US Armed Forces will not be 
easy.  The fact that other large organizations, including 
foreign militaries, have been able to successfully implement 
such dramatic changes provides evidence that the United 
States Military could do so as well.  Indeed, it has already 
done so, when it integrated African-Americans and introduced 
females into more combat roles.  The question is not whether 
the obstacles are impossible to overcome—they clearly are 
not.  The question is why some believe the United States 
Military is especially incapable of issuing and following 
orders.  As Dr. Nathaniel Frank wrote in the Washington 
Post,  
The question is not how similar our missions are 
to those of other nations but whether the United 
States is any less capable than other nations of 
integrating gays into its military.  There is no 
conclusive evidence that U.S. commanders are 
peculiarly unable to direct those under their 
command to behave as a professional fighting 
force.[87] 
 
Our military does not want men and women who are so 
intolerant of those different from them that they cannot 
work with, supervise, or be supervised by them.  The 
military should have no tolerance for those who will not do 
what they are told.  Simply stated, should the US change its 
policy, it would direct its soldiers to work with their 
fellow soldiers regardless of sexual orientation.  Those 
soldiers would then either comply or leave.  Some might even 
argue it would be beneficial for the military to learn now 
which of its soldiers will refuse lawful orders, so that it 
will not have to learn when under fire from an enemy. 
 These obstacles concern how the new policy would be 
implemented.  Once again, looking to foreign militaries 
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provides a blueprint on how to successfully implement the 
new policy (or, more accurately, eliminate the old policy 
and remove all restrictions to homosexual service).  The 
experience of foreign militaries suggests that leadership 
and clarity can be decidedly helpful in the transition.  
Other implementation procedures should include “rewards for 
any movement that supports implementation of the policy,” 
appropriate pressure to comply, and “room for bottom-level 
input into the process.”[88]  Implementation studies 
indicate that the critical component is the proper behavior 
of implementors.  Committed implementors are the driving 
force behind successful change in an organization, and 
uncommitted leaders are a primary restraint for efforts at 
change.[88]  RAND lists a number of things that would help 
tremendously in implementing a policy to end discrimination.  
The steps suggested by RAND in order to design a policy that 
facilitates implementation are as follows: 
• Convey the policy as simply as possible and 
build in supports for change, such as a code of 
professional conduct and universal 
responsibility for respecting others.  
Additionally, high-level individuals should be 
designated as responsible for successful 
implementation. 
• Convey the change in terms compatible with 
military culture, such as by emphasizing 
submersion of individual preference, the 
obligation to follow orders, and the military’s 
“can-do” attitude. 
• Stress behavioral compliance and create 
sanctions for failure to comply.  Emphasize 
that leaders are responsible for their own 
behavior and for those of their subordinates. 
• Allow members to voice their views and know 
that they have been heard, while emphasizing 
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that the implementation plan was developed in a 
fair manner. 
• Ensure top leadership support, at least 
behaviorally, and ensure they publicly show 
that support. 
• Involve leaders down to the lowest level, and 
train them in proper implementation techniques. 
• Set up monitoring mechanisms that will assess 
the implementation process.[88] 
Lifting the ban will likely not be as easy as 
opponents of the ban hope, nor will it be as disastrous 
as proponents predict.  By studying how others have 
successfully done it, the likelihood of successfully 
doing it in the US military increases.  Both Canada and 
Great Britain chose a top down approach that emphasized 
compliance and demanded their military officers get 
educated and support the policy themselves. According to 
the RAND Corporation, 
 if the military services are eventually ordered to 
cease excluding homosexuals who engage in 
homosexual behavior, they will do so quite 
effectively and without major incidents, provided 
that the leadership...clearly communicate[s] 
support for the change.[88]  
 
In any case, there is no reason to believe that the US 
military would be unable to implement the change if 
political leaders chose to make it. 
 This thesis has shown that the US Government should 
make the change.  Currently, those who favor the ban claim 
lifting it would harm cohesion and thus military 
performance.  Literally hundreds of studies have shown that 
it is only task cohesion that affects performance, however.  
As long as the members are committed to the same goal, they 
have task cohesion, and performance will improve, no matter 
whether the members like or dislike each other.   
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 In addition to the studies showing social cohesion has 
no effect on performance, there is overwhelming empirical 
evidence that shows the presence of gays does not harm 
military efficacy.  There are now two dozen nations that 
have lifted all restrictions on homosexual service, and none 
of them have reported significant problems.  In many cases, 
the military establishment predicted dire consequences if 
the ban was lifted, similar to the predictions now espoused 
by those who favor the ban in the United States. 
While the military often justifiably prioritizes 
cohesion over individual rights, the evidence shows that 
gays and lesbians will not harm cohesion.  The fact that the 
military has suspended the ban in every conflict since World 
War II indicates that it must also be relatively unconcerned 
about gays harming cohesion on the battlefield.  The fact 
that 24 foreign military forces, as well as the Central 
Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the 
staff of the National Security Advisor, the Secret Service, 
and scores of American fire and police departments have 
lifted their bans with no problems indicates that the 
presence of admitted homosexuals does not harm unit 
cohesion.[87] 
 The absence of a negative effect may not be enough to 
convince decision-makers to lift the ban, however.  Those 
who are not convinced that the absence of a negative effect, 
combined with improved civil rights, is reason enough to 
lift the ban should consider the cost of the ban for the 
United States.  Using the estimates of the GAO, the 
replacement cost alone for discharged homosexual troops is 
$40 million per year.  For perspective, consider that, 
despite the fact the Central Intelligence Agency has 
concluded the most likely way weapons of mass destruction 
would enter the US is by sea, the federal government is 
still woefully behind in securing America’s ports.[89]  US 
President George W. Bush has asked for $46 million in the 
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2005 budget to upgrade security for the nation’s 361 ports.  
According to a Los Angeles Times report, “inadequate 
government funding has slowed efforts to secure some of the 
nation’s waterways.”[90]  If the funds currently used to 
discharge homosexual soldiers against their will were to be 
used for port security, the funds would nearly double 
instantaneously. 
 Of course, the cost is actually more than just 
financial.  The government is denying the civil rights of a 
certain class of Americans for no justifiable reason.  In 
fact, DADTDPDH is the only law in America that allows an 
employer to fire an employee for being gay.  Not only does 
it allow it, it compels it, since expulsion is mandatory for 
those found guilty of homosexual conduct.  Commanders have 
no choice in the punishment, no matter how professional the 
soldier is. 
 The injustice in this matter is verified by the latest 
research concluding that homosexuality is an immutable 
characteristic.  Once this is understood, the folly of 
telling homosexuals not to engage in homosexual conduct is 
as evident as it would be if heterosexuals were told not to 
engage in heterosexual conduct.  Such an order is simply 
unrealistic.   
 Despite the evidence that already exists, more work 
needs to be done.  For instance, the military needs to track 
the man-hours spent investigating, prosecuting, and 
counseling homosexuals under suspicion of violating the 
current policy.  Once an accurate dollar figure for the cost 
of the ban is surmised, political leaders might be more 
likely to weigh those costs against the supposed benefits of 
the ban and find the moral and political courage and 
authority to repeal it.  Included among these costs, of 
course, are the wasted human resources of America’s 
homosexual population.  In a nation with 145 million males, 
the male homosexual population is estimated to be between 
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4.35 million and 53.65 million, depending on one’s 
definition and source of data.  Certainly, a clear 
definition and better census of the number of gay Americans 
would be another suggested area for further research.  Even 
using the low estimate of 3%, the number is too high to 
ignore.  If this group were to join at the same rate as the 
heterosexual population, the US would have thousands more 
troops in uniform, at a time when both military and 
political leaders are determining that there are too few 
troops available.  The addition of female homosexuals into 
the equation only bolsters the argument.  It is impossible 
to deny that the cost America is paying for this policy is 
high.  Some say it is worth it.  All existing data indicates 
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